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This paper examines the existence of a relationship between political institutions and
economic growth in Kenya. Through empirical analysis, carried out for the period
between 1963-2014, the study aims to use the findings to improve and develop the
policy in this area. The variables under scrutiny in this paper are GDP, political
rights and civil liberties. Univariate and multivariate time series analysis are used to
examine the relationship. The univariate time series helps to evaluate stationarity of
the variables. The study finds that all three variables are non-stationary in the level
unit root test. The multivariate time series examines the long run and short run
relationships. The Engle-Granger test showed no cointegration between the
variables. After subjecting the variables to a Johansen test, cointegration was found
to exist indicating two cointegrating equations. This proves that indeed a long run
relationship exists among the variables. Granger Causality tests reveal that political
rights Granger Cause GDP at the 5% significance level. However, at the 10% level
there was some significant causality from civil liberties to GDP and civil liberties to
political rights.
Keywords: growth, economic institutions, political institutions, Kenya
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves
secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not
supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be
regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to
pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in
which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.



















11 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Introduction
In 2007, more than 70% of the world's output was produced by 15% of the world's
population. New Institutional Economics attempts to explain the well-documented
'productivity' gap of many developing (and particularly African) countries. The
productivity gap refers to the difference in output between various countries that
remains even after differences in factor quantity and quality are accounted for . The
argument, in brief, is that institutions affect the productivity of capital and labour
through their incentive effects and through their impact on the allocation of
resources.
Positioned on the equator of Africa's east coast, Kenya is the economic capital
of East Africa. Kenya stretches from the snow capped peaks of Mount Kenya to the
shores of the Indian Ocean characterized by stretches of coral rock and sand
interrupted by bays, inlets and branched creeks. The country is a world destination
for tourists who flood in to experience wildlife and safaris. The Kenyan Highlands,
divided by the Great Rift Valley into east and west, are rich in deep fertile volcanic
soils that support this agriculturally driven economy.
The 2014 World Bank statistics indicate that at US$60,937 million Kenya's
economy is the largest GDP in Southeast and Central Africa. Nonetheless, Kenya is
immersed in a very broad political-economic gap; a gap that separates "the haves"
from"the have-nots" . Kenya's historical political arena is nothing short of dramatic.
The last five decades have witnessed a rather fascinating transformation in terms of
governance structures, institutions and processes (Myers, 2011). The first fifteen
years, which basically laid down the political foundation, were marked by
institutions characterized by ethnic politics and personalized power, centered on the
executive branch of government (Mzee [omo Kenyatta at the time). The next twenty-
four years were domineered by former President Daniel arap Moi who "consistently
demonstrated an adroit touch in his use of ethnicity as a tool of politics" (Branch, 2012).
During his reign, the constitution of Kenya was amended severally, including the
addition of a section 2A that made Kenya a single party state. Thus, KANU was the
only legal political party for much of the 1980s. Following much violent unrest and
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international pressure, section 2A was repealed and in 1992 Kenya's status was
restored to multi-party.
The presidency of Mwai Kibaki represented the start of the post authoritarian
era. NARC put an end to thirty-nine years under KANU's rule. Unlike his
predecessors, Kibaki sought to bridge the gap between dejure institutions and defacto
reality. He implemented free primary education in 2003, resumed nationwide
development projects like construction of water, health and education facilities
(Njeru, 2006), and oversaw the creation of Kenya's Vision 2030 - a long term
development plan aimed at raising GDP growth to 10% annually and transforming
Kenya into an industrializing middle income country providing high quality of life
to all its citizens by 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2009). GDP growth picked up from
a low 0.6% (real-1.6%) in 2002 to 3% in 2003, 4.9% in 2004, 5.8% in 2005, 6% in 2006
and 7% 2007, then after the post election chaos and Global Financial Crisis-2008
(1.7%)and 2009 (2.6%), recovered to 5% in 2010 and 5% in 2011 (Mundi, 2015).
Kenya also witnessed the promulgation of a new Constitution on 27th August
2010, which marked a pivotal point in the country's history. The Constitution now
mandates the devolution of power to the new counties, calls for land reforms and
puts in place checks and balances that constrain the powers of the president. It
ensures that political efforts, henceforth, are geared towards wise reforms that will
drive economic growth.
The swearing in of Kenya's fourth president, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,
marked the official launch of decentralization. The sweeping changes in Kenya's
policy and institutional framework have brought about a new regime of governance.
Multiple new laws have been put in place-including new legislation on county
government, urban areas, public financial management, and the transition to
devolved government-as well as multiple national bodies and commissions with
responsibility for devolution. Functions and funds have been transferred to the new
counties, and new county institutions are gradually taking shape. In addition, the
country has since embarked on several major development projects including the
world's largest Geothermal power plant (Wahito, 2014) and the Standard Gauge
Railway running from Mombasa to Uganda, South Sudan and Rwanda.
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Statement of the research problem
Weak institutions severely undermine economic growth and development. Exclusive
political and economic institutions are mainly characterized by corrupt leaders and
systems, which generate political conflict and threaten a country's well-being and
social peace. Inappropriate institutions render an economy barren: promoting
instead insecurity, unemployment, social discrimination and injustices, illiteracy -
ultimately resulting in chronic poverty.
Despite being the cradle of mankind, Africa straggles several centuries
behind the rest of the world. A continent with dynamic people, diverse culture
representing vibrant energy, abundant natural resources, scenic physical features,
unique wildlife, hospitable climate and much more. Africa, however, is also
associated with issues such as disease, spontaneous civil wars, corruption, and lack
of reliable sources of clean water - all of which are the dividend of poor institutions.
Kenya's economic growth was revived slightly over a decade ago with the
genesis of the Kibaki era. Prior to that, the country had experienced a monumental
economic downturn (real GDP was as low as -1.6%) that can be attributed to the
institutions that had been erected during the authoritarian era.
Today, political stability, national security and protection of property rights
playa crucial role in fostering an environment that is conducive for both social and
economic development. If Kenya is to compete on a global level in terms of output
and productivity, then, the quality of institutions must be addressed to ensure
robustness.
By evaluating Kenya's historical political arena between the years 1963 to
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Sub-objectives
i. To evaluate the univariate characteristics of institutions and economic growth
in Kenya
ii. To examine the multivariate relationship between institutions and growth in
the context of Kenya
Research Questions
Is there a relationship between institutions and economic growth?
Justification of the study
Academic Justification
By seeking a more analytically informed account of the relationship between political
freedom, property rights and political instability, this article intends to contribute to
the open-ended, research studies on the political and institutional sources of growth
and development in Kenya.
Policy Justification
The research is set to evaluate the relationship that exists between institutions and
economic growth in Kenya, so as to inform the policy makers on appropriate tools
and mechanism in their objectives of ensuring political stability, protection of
property rights and national security.
The key step of this study is to develop a better understanding of how
political institutions impact economic performance. This understanding can then be
used to derive policy priorities accordingly, in a way that uses efficiently the scarce
political capital of reformers.
Though the research is of an exploratory nature, the results could shed light
to policymakers on which institutional aspects should be principally targeted at
raising rates of growth (growth strategies) and which ones are vital to maintaining




The outline of this chapter is as follows. The study first lays out the theoretical
literature, comparing and contrasting the different schools of thought that attempt to
account for the existing productivity gap between developed and developing
countries. This is followed by the empirical literature, which is subdivided into four
sections: developed countries, developing countries, African countries and Kenya.
Finally the study outlines the gap that exists in the literature, which is immediately
followed by the theoretical framework and the hypotheses.
Theoretical Literature
Several theories have been brought forward in an attempt to account for the
divergent inequality that persists between "rich" and "poor" countries. The
geography hypothesis, one of the more prevailing theories, traces a pattern that links
economic performance to the geographical site of a country. Apparently, countries
that lie within the tropics are poor and those that are found in the temperate
latitudes are rich. Writings by Sachs (2001), Diamond (1997), and Gallup et al. (1998)
argue that warm climate within the tropics provide conducive breeding grounds for
tropical diseases like malaria to thrive. A combination of the rampant disease and the
laziness of the inhabitants (due to the heat) negatively impact the quality of available
human resources. The authors believe that geography exerts a strong influence on
agricultural productivity and the quality of human resources.
Another perspective emphasizes the role of international trade as a key driver
of productivity change. Authors such as Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that trade
integration is the major determinant of whether a country grows or not. Therefore,
the gap between rich and poor countries is purely credited to the degree of a
country's market integration.
A third strand of literature tries to explain this phenomena using a theory
linked to culture. Max Weber, a German socialist, was convinced that the Protestant
Reformation played a critical factor in promoting the rise of the modern industrial
society in Western Europe. Apart from religion, the other central principles to the
cultural hypothesis are beliefs, values and ethics. For example, a society that lacks a
good work ethic and is resistant to Western technologies will lag behind a society
that advocates for high work standards and technology. While some of the points
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presented by this strand of thought are valid, a lot of cultural aspects are just not
important for understanding why the inequalities in the world persist (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2012).
Still, another set of explanations is anchored on knowledge or the lack of it.
This is the ignorance hypothesis. It purports that poor countries are poor because
their rulers do not know how to transform their economies into rich ones. Lionel
Robbins (1935) defines economics as "a science that studies human behavior as a
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses". It follows,
from the First Welfare Theorem, that a society will desire a market economy where
all individuals and firms can freely exchange goods and services. When these
circumstances do not hold, market inefficiencies cultivate - inevitably leading to
market failures . The ignorance hypothesis believes that poor countries are poor due
to the market failures they exhibit - their economists and policymakers do not know
how to get rid of them or have sought wrong advice in the past (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2012).
A final group of explanations centers on institutions, and in particular the
role of property rights and the rule of law. North (1990,2005), a key scholar, suggests
that institutions are the rules of the game in a society and organizations are the
players. Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction and organizations are groups of individuals who work toward a common
goal or objective and have common interests. North identifies formal and informal
constraints as the main elements of institutions. Informal constraints refer to norms,
social taboos and interpersonal systems such as reputation, trust and information
sharing. Formal constraints, on the other hand, relate to written laws and
regulations. The two coexist; however, formal constraints only come into playas the
size of the group grows in size or when individuals must interact with outsiders.
Informal interactions occur within small member groups. Due to their close-
knit traits, the restrictions are relaxed as reputation, trust and mutual knowledge
among members facilitate efficient transactions within the group. As more members
are enlisted and interactions with outsiders become necessary, so does the need for
formal constraints. In such situations, parties to contracts do not always know each
other so the risk of default becomes more apparent. To curb the risk of default, cost
and level of sureties are incorporated into contracts resulting in transaction costs.
One major consequence of increasing transaction costs is transformation costs, which
are incurred as a new set of institutions, are created - merchant houses, formal laws,
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international trade treaties. Authors such as Acemoglu et al. (2001), Hall and Jones
(1999) strongly support North's thinking. In addition, Hall and Jones (1999) and
Fedderke (2001) emphasize that property rights are frequently advanced as the
institutions of greatest significance to economic growth, lowering uncertainty and
transactions costs associated with economic activity.
North suggests that the reason inefficient institutions continue is due to the
imbalance in the distribution of transaction and transformation costs but to a greater
extent because of the concentration of political powers within the hands of a few .
When such conditions hold, elites are resistant to change to the extent that they
intentionally sabotage institutions in order to preserve their personal interests.
Classical economists Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, Thomas
Malthus, and John Stuart Mill hold a different view. They assert that markets
function best without government interference. In his book Wealth of Nations, Adam
Smith explains that the wealth of nations is not based on gold but on trade: That
when two parties freely agree to exchange things of value, because both see a profit
in the exchange, total wealth increases. Classical economics originally differed from
modern libertarian economics in seeing a role for the state in providing for the
common good. Smith acknowledges that there are areas where the market is not the
best way to serve the public good, education being one example. He takes it as a
given that the greater proportion of the costs of these public goods should be born by
those best able to afford them.
The main idea brought about by classical economics, that is, that production
will generate enough income to allow its own products to be purchased sets motion
to the modernization theory. Lipset (1959), being the seminal contributor to this
theory, postulates a link from economic development to democratization, such that
' good things go together'. Political freedom is effectively viewed as a luxury good
whose high-income elasticity ensures emergence of democratization only at high
levels of per capita income. The development of strong forms of associational life
with economic growth is further held to reinforce the emergence and sustainability
of democratic institutions. Only after agents realize economic well being, will their
demand for additional civil liberty and political rights find expression. The view
implies that there is a Maslowian hierarchy of human aspirations, such that once
certain (basic) needs of survival are met, higher order needs such as political and
social expression are pursued (Fedderke, 2001). Supporting authors of this strand of
literature are Cutright (1963), Helliwell (1992) and Diamond (1992).
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), on the other hand, echo the words of
Douglass North - that all economic institutions are created by society. They
contribute further to this discussion by arguing that economic success is a function of
good institutions, incentives that motivate productivity and innovation as well as
rules that influence the economy.
They recognize two breeds of economic institutions: inclusive and extractive
economic institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are characterized by
participation of the masses in economic activities, freedom of choice, secure private
property, unbiased system of law, public services, and ability of parties to exchange
and contract on a level playing field. The main responsibility of the state is to culture
a habitat where individuals can flourish. In summary, inclusive economic
institutions equate to economic activity, productivity growth and economic




This section is subdivided into four parts: developed countries, developing countries,
African countries and the case of Kenya.
Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi (2004) estimated the respective contributions
of institutions, geography and trade in determining income levels by sampling 79
countries and a larger sample of 137 countries around the world. Their results
indicate that the quality of institutions contributes significantly to income levels.
Once institutions are controlled for, conventional measures of geography have weak
effects on income levels, although they have a strong indirect effect by influencing
the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, trade is
almost always insignificant.
Easterly and Levine (2003) assert that (macroeconomic) policies do not have
an effect on incomes, once institutions are controlled for . Rodrik, Subramanian, &
Trebbi's view on the effectiveness of policy is similar to that expressed in Acemoglu
et al. (2001, 1395): there are " substantial economic gains from improving institutions,
for example as in the case of Japan during the Meiji Restoration or South Korea
during the 1960s" "or, one may add, China since the late 1970s. The distinction
between institutions and policies is murky, as these examples illustrate. The reforms
that Japan, South Korea, and China undertook were policy innovations that
eventually resulted in a fundamental change in the institutional underpinning of
their economies.
In acknowledgement of this, Cutright (1963) shows that national social
conditions are related to national political systems. He demonstrates this by building
an index of political development, which can be correlated with other system
variables to measure the extent of the association between the development of the
political system and development of other social institutions in the nation. The
author examines the political development for 77 independent nations (excluding
Atrleen l;oY.l'l tritl§ du~ to mlssing datu) between 1940 find 1960 i.md fi§§ign§ d §~or§ to
@(\(;h country ba1:i~d r;m l:J(iHU(;Ell ImitobilHy anct m'~(\ nl~(\ Hmlil l 1:i h' lWhll'{~ Of
government (l§gi§Ii:l HVt"~ m d exeeutlvebrnnehes) , 'fh€l index is eerrelatedwith several
ether hlctk nh:)f 1:i (if nnt!(1rml ct @v~I(1pm@n t, The 1'~ ~HJIt§ show Hmt H1t11l~v@l of poUUt;al
development is highly correlated with the level of communications, economic
development, education and urbanization.
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Helliwell (1994) addresses this relationship by evaluating the two-way
linkages between democracy and economic growth. In using cross-sectional and
pooled data for 125 countries between the periods 1960 to 1980 he finds the effects of
income on democracy to be robust and positive. The effects of several measures of
democracy and personal freedoms on growth are assessed in a comparative growth
framework in which growth of GDP per adult depends negatively on initial income
levels, as implied by the convergence hypothesis, and positively on rates of
investment in physical and human capital. Adjusting for the simultaneous
determination of income and democracy makes the estimated partial effect of
democracy on subsequent economic growth negative but insignificant. This non-
significant negative effect is in any case counterbalanced by the positive indirect
effect that democracy exerts on growth via education and investment. However, the
general result of the growth analysis is that it is still not possible to identify any
systematic net effects of democracy on subsequent economic growth.
Przeworski et al. (2000) show, quite compellingly, that there is no evidence to
support the claim that democracy needs to be sacrificed in the name of economic
development. Democratic governments are supposed to be more transparent and
accountable because they are answerable to the citizens, therefore, are more likely to
observe property rights and enhance growth and development. On the other end of
the scale, dictatorial regimes are more likely to infringe on property rights since they
are not answerable to any persons. Barro (1996) strongly rejects this view and argues
that democracy and growth have a negative relationship. He explains that as
democracy increases, the level of economic performance decreases due to the
bureaucratic systems that slow down the decision making process as well as the
redistribution of resources for political motives. He demonstrates, therefore, that a
dictatorial regime can uphold property rights and a democratic government can
violate them as illustrated in the case of the Argentinian Junta and the Bolivian
regime. Yet, it is also true that the empirical evidence on the relationship between
political regimes and economic growth is still ambiguous. In a comprehensive
review of the literature, Feng (2003) argues that: "despite fertile theoretical literature
on the subject, cross-national quantitative efforts at testing various hypotheses fell
short in their attempt to produce clear empirical evidence.
Hall and Jones (1999) take a different approach, which insists that the pivot of
economic growth is the protection of property rights. The duo argue that
empowering members of society with the ability to own, transfer and fully enjoy
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their property gives them incentives to work harder, invest more and augments their
productivity. Across their study of 127 countries, they find a powerful and close
association between output per worker and measures of social infrastructure.
Countries with long-standing policies favorable to productive activities-rather than
diversion - produce much more output per worker. Countries with corrupt
government officials, severe impediments to trade, poor contract enforcement, and
government interference in production will be unable to achieve levels of output per
worker anywhere near the norms of western Europe, northern America, and eastern
Asia. In their study, the countries with the highest measured levels of social
infrastructure are Switzerland, the United States, and Canada, and all three are
among the countries with the highest levels of output per worker. Three countries
that are close to the lowest in social infrastructure are Zaire, Haiti, and Bangladesh,
and all three have low levels of output per worker. Their empirical analysis suggests
that success on each of these fronts is driven by social infrastructure, that is,
primarily; institutions determine a country's long-run economic performance and
government policies. Thus, they make up the economic environment within which
individuals and firms make investments, create and transfer ideas, and produce
goods and services.
Acemoglu and Robinson resonate with Hall and Jones, strongly agreeing that
property rights playa crucial role with respect to growth. They insist that secure
property rights provide the incentives that stimulate people to invest, innovate and
be more productive. They are cautious to remind us that these opportunities must be
made available to the majority and not just a select elite.
Nonetheless, Bollen (1980,1990) advocates for researchers to take caution
when defining and measuring institutions. His study unveils the concealed dangers
when usin g either objectlve (;)1' subjective meaaures to define and quantify
intilHtution5. He dernonetrates this by building a hypothetical index of three countrles
to meesure polltleal democracy i111d stability for a Hmescale of five years, In many
instances, the indicators used in this field do not represent the institutions to which
they are attributed. Objective measures only capture related issues and not the actual
strength or format of institutions. Freedom of press and voter turnout are not sound
measures of democracy, neither does election information determine the type of
regime or institutional structure. On the other extreme, subjective measurements are
highly prone to bias . Often, observations of situations are carried out by external
organizations whose interpretations are most likely tainted as they take little or no
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account of local exposition and influences. Thus, there is high likelihood of
misinterpretation and missing important data. To counter this, Bollen recommends
that researchers explicitly state their underlying assumptions and steps involved in
building indices when using subjective indicators.
In Africa, Gwenhamo et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between
institutions and economic growth in Zimbabwe for the period 1946 to 2005. They
measure institutions through an index by systematically coding the indicators of
political freedom, property rights and political instability. Empirical evidence shows
correlations between the new measures reveal that while political instability has a
strong and negative relationship with property rights, it has no significant
relationship with political freedom. The finding supports the notion that political
conflict is significantly higher in the in-between category of semi-democracy than at
either end of the democracy scale. The two core results of the study are that property
rights influence the volumes of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Zimbabwe and
that negative spillover effects of poor institutional environments can occur between
neighbouring countries.
Similarly, Fedderke and Garlick (2011) reveal extremely high correlations
between the political freedoms index and the various property rights indices.
Through a thorough investigation of political and property rights in Malawi, the pair
suggests that lack of political freedom is associated with lack of economic freedom
and security. However, the low correlation between their property rights indices and
an index based on de facto property rights implies that President Banda's
dictatorship chose to respect property rights, in the main, despite his legal power to
abrogate them.
On the same note, Fedderke et al. (2001) examine how indicators of political
liberty, property rights and political instability impact economic development in
South Africa. The study focuses on the years between 1935 and 1997. The results
show that for South Africa the impact of institutions is indirect, via the capital-labour
ratio. Moreover property rights and political instability dimensions, not the political
freedom measure, have greater significance on growth. The political freedom
measure appears to be an ' outcome' variable of per capita output as predicted by
modernization theory. However, the sign of the association is the opposite of that
predicted by modernization theory. One possible interpretation is that development
brought with it increasing pressure for political reform, and the Apartheid state
responded by ever increasing levels of repression. The negative sign is not
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necessarily evidence against modernization theory, but it does suggest the
importance of appropriate modulation to the theory. The evidence suggests that
there may indeed be interaction between institutions and per capita output that
suggests the importance of simultaneity between the dimensions. Per capita output
is found to influence the level of political instability, while political instability will
come to impact on per capita output through the capital-labour ratio.
Sala-i -Martin and Subramanian (2003) address the natural resource curse
through an illustration of Nigeria. They establish that some natural resources, such
as oil and minerals in particular, exert a negative and nonlinear impact on growth
via their deleterious impact on institutional quality. The pair show this result to be
very robust. The Nigerian experience provides telling confirmation of this aspect of
natural resources. Waste and corruption from oil rather than Dutch disease has been
responsible for its poor long run economic performance. They propose a solution for
addressing this resource curse, which involves directly distributing the oil revenues
to the public. Even with all the difficulties of corruption and inefficiency that will no
doubt plague its actual implementation, their proposal will, at the least, be vastly
superior to the status quo. At best, however, it could fundamentally improve the
quality of public institutions and, as a result, transform economics and politics in
Nigeria.
In Kenya, Bedasso (2012) conducted a research study with the objective of
investigating the effects of historical elite competition and consolidation on political-
economic stability and institutional transition in post-independence Kenya. The
study finds that most of the existing institutional structures in Kenya are built on
elite configurations inherited from the colonial times. The robust growth
performance of the first decade after independence was generated by smallholder
agriculture, while most of the rent was transferred to the elite via state patronage.
The political instability of the later years had a lot to do with dwindling patronage
resources and elite fragmentation. For most part of the political economy history of
the country, patron-client networks and tribalism have played key role in regulating
intra-elite bargains. In addition, land has been the leverage used by the elite to
manipulate the aforementioned structures. The study concludes that as long as the
new constitution provides a framework for the enforcement of intra-elite
agreements, Kenya could eventually move to equilibrium where its resilient enclaves




Earlier studies that sought to establish a relationship between institutions and
economic growth in Kenya were carried out before the implementation of the
devolved government. This study examines the nexus that exists between
institutions and growth and development in Ken ya in the post independence period
especially looking at the changes that have occurred in the transition from
centralized to devolved government. In addition, the paper aims to study what
impact this monumental shift in institutions has had on Kenya's growth so far. The
key indicators that will be used to measure institutions are political freedom,
property rights and political instability - adopted from a study done by Gwenhamo
et al. that focused on Zimbabwe.
Theoretical Framework
On the basis of the earlier discussion in the literature review, the interplay between
institutions, human behaviour and economic outcomes is illustrated in Figurel:
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Research hypothesis
Null hypothesis (Ho): There is no significant causality relationship between
institutions and economic growth.
Alternative Hypothesis (Hs): There is a significant causality relationship between




The research being conducted is exploratory research, which is conducted to provide
a better understanding of a situation and is not conclusive in nature. Researchers are
able to produce a hypothesis about what is actually going on in a situation through
exploratory research design. At the end of this study, results will be drawn on the
relationship that exists between institutions and economic growth in Kenya.
Sources of data
The study relies on indices from Freedom House, Heritage Foundation and Polity IV




A measure of political rights held by citizens. The calculation of this variable is based
on ten political questions grouped into three sub-categories: (1) electoral process; (2)
political pluralism and participation; (3) functioning of government
Civil Liberties (CL)
A measure of civil liberties held by citizens. The calculation of this variable is based
on fifteen political questions grouped into four sub-categories: (1) freedom of
expression and belief; (2) associational and organizational rights; (3) rule of law; (4)
personal autonomy and individual rights.
Criticisms of existing institutional indicators
There are some methodological and conceptual difficulties in constructing
perception-based institutional indices. First, precision may be affected by perceptual
biases of the judges making the subjective ratings. Second, the indices tend to
summarize a large amount of information across a range of distinct dimensions
inevitably hiding the important changes that take place within these dimensions.
Methodology
The objective of the study is to examine the relationship between institutions and
economic growth with a specific focus on Kenya. A bi-variate regression model is
designed to test the effects of macroeconomic variables on the stock prices.
GDP = IX + ~lCL + ~2PR + ut --------------------------(1)
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Univariate time series analysis
When dealing with time series data, a number of econometric issues can influence
the estimation of parameters using OLS. Regressing a time series variable on another
time series variable using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation can obtain a
very high R2, although there is no meaningful relationship between the variables.
This situation reflects the problem of spurious regression between totally unrelated
variables generated by a non-stationary process (Sarbapriya, 2013).
Therefore, prior to testing and implementing the Granger Causality test,
econometric methodology requires the examination of the stationarity characteristics.
It is recommended that a unit root test be carried out to test for the order of
integration. A series is said to be stationary if the mean and variance are time-
invariant (Sarbapriya, 2013). With this knowledge, the GDP, civil liberties and
political rights are evaluated for stationarity and the results provide useful insight on
how to approach the multivariate tests because they are dependent on the univariate
characteristics of the data.
A non-stationary time series will have a time dependent mean which makes
the standard assumptions for asymptotic analysis in the Granger test not be valid .
Therefore, a stochastic process that is said to be stationary simply implies that the
mean and the variance of Y remain constant over time for all t, and the covariance
and hence the correlation between any two values of Y taken from different time
periods depends on the difference apart in time between the two values for all t#s .
Since standard regression analysis requires that data series be stationary, it is
obviously important that we first test for this requirement to determine whether the
series used in the regression process is a difference stationary or a trend stationary
(Sarbapriya, 2013).
Formal tests of stationarity are used on the variables to establish the
univariate characteristics of the three variables, that is, the (Dickey & Fuller, 1979)
(ADF) test and Phillips- Perron (PP) Test. To test the statioriary of variables, we use
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) which is mostly used to test for unit root and
complement it with Phillip & Perron (1988) to ensure robustness of the results
obtained.
The following equation checks the stationarity of time series data used in the study:
nLlYt = Pl + ~1t + u yt-l + YL:LlYt-l + ct ------(2)
Where ct is white noise error term in the model of unit root test, with a null
hypothesis that the variable has unit root. The ADF regression test for the existence
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of unit root of yt that represents all variables at time t. The test for a unit root is
conducted on the coefficient of yt-lin the regression. If the coefficient is significantly
different from zero (less than zero), then the hypothesis that y contains a unit root is
rejected. The null and alternative hypothesis for the existence of unit root in variable
y. is:
HO; a. = 0 versus HI: a.< O.
Rejection of the null hypothesis denotes stationarity in the series.
If the ADF test-statistic (t-statistic) is less (in the absolute value) than the Mackinnon
critical t-values, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for the time
series and hence, one can conclude that the series is non-stationary at their levels.
The unit root test tests for the existence of a unit root in two cases: with intercept
only, and with intercept and trend to take into the account the impact of the trend on
the series (Sarbapriya, 2013).
The PP tests are non-parametric unit root tests that are modified so that serial
correlation does not affect their asymptotic distribution. PP tests reveal that all
variables are integrated of order one with and without linear trends, and with or
without intercept terms. It is used in time series analysis to test the null hypothesis
that a time series is integrated of order 1. It builds on the Dickey-Fuller test. Like the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Perron test addresses the issue that the
process generating data for yt might have a higher order of autocorrelation than is
admitted in the test equation, making yt - 1 endogenous, and thus invalidating the
Dickey-Fuller t-test (Sarbapriya, 2013).
Whilst the augmented Dickey-Fuller test addresses this issue by introducing
lags of Llyt as regressors in the test equation, the Phillips-Perron test makes a non-
parametric correction to the t-test statistic. The test is robust with respect to
unspecified autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the disturbance process of the
test equation (Sarbapriya, 2013).
Multivariate time series analysis
With some types of trended series, we can check if they are involved in an
equilibrium relationship, that is, we can test to see if they are co-integrated. In most
cases, if we combine two variables which are I(I), then the combination will also be
I(I).The controversial bit in co-integration is that the variables co-integrating must
have a unit root problem. This implies that if either civil liberties or political rights
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fail the stationarity test, the likelihood of a long run relationship with GDP is
minimal thus remaining with only the possibility of a short run relationship.
When the concept of non -stationarity was first considered, a usual response
was to independently take the first differences of a series of 1(1) variables. The
problem with this approach is that pure first difference models have no long run
solution (Brooks, 2008).
Many time series are non-stationary but "move together" over time . If
variables are co-integrated, it means that a linear combination of them will be
stationary. A co-integrating relationship may also be seen as a long-term
relationship. No co-integration implies that series could wander apart without being
bound in the long run (Brooks, 2008). This would mean that if we test for co-
integration in the data used for research, it would be possible to establish the
presence or absence of long run equilibrium relationship of the GDP and the two
asset classes. This would result in a conclusion in support or against the hypothesis
of the relationship between the variables.
Engle and Granger (1987) have tabulated a new set of critical values and
hence the test is known as the Engle Granger (E.G.) test. This method suffers from a
number of problems which are: unit root and co-integration tests having low power
in finite samples; which means we are forced to treat the variables asymmetrically
and to specify one as the dependent, and the other as independent variables and
cannot perform any hypothesis tests about the actual co-integrating relationship
estimated at the first stage (Brooks, 2008).
The Johansen (1989) test is used to complement the Engle Granger Test and is
not based on the Dickey-Fuller test for unit root in the residuals from a single
cointegrating relationship unlike the Engle Granger. Carrying out this test allows for
robust results to be drawn on the long run equilibrium relationship.
The strengths and weaknesses of the two tests result in none of them being out
rightly better than the other. For small samples and multivariate tests, the Johansen
(1989) is better, while for bivariate tests of data, Engle Granger is superior. It is worth
pointing out that the Johansen (1989) test sometimes indicates the presence of




The vector Autoregression (VAR) model is one of the most successful, flexible, and
easy to use models for the analysis of multivariate time series. It is a natural
extension of the univariate autoregressive model to dynamic multivariate time series.
The VAR model has proven to be especially useful for describing the dynamic
behavior of economic time series and for forecasting. It often provides superior
forecasts to those from univariate time series models and elaborate theory-based
simultaneous equations models. Forecasts from VAR models are quite flexible
because they can be made conditional on the potential future paths of specified
variables in the model.
In addition to data description and forecasting, the VAR model is also used
for structural inference and policy analysis. In structural analysis, certain
assumptions about the causal structure of the data under investigation are imposed,
and the resulting causal impacts of unexpected shocks or innovations to specified
variables on the variables in the model are summarized . These causal impacts are
usually summarized with impulse response functions and forecast error variance
decompositions.
The section that follows constitutes of Granger Causality, impulse response and
variance decomposition.
Granger causality test
Causality is a kind of statistical feedback concept, which is widely used in the
building of forecasting models. Historically, Granger (1969) and Sim (1972) were the
ones who formalized the application of causality in economics. Granger causality test
is a technique for determining whether one time series is significant in forecasting
another (Granger, 1969). The standard Granger causality test (Granger, 1988) seeks to
determine whether past values of a variable help to predict changes in another
variable. The definition states that in the conditional distribution, lagged values of Yt
add no information to explanation of movements of Xt beyond that provided by
lagged values of Xt itself (Green, 2003).
We should take note of the fact that the Granger causality technique measures the
information given by one variable in explaining the latest value of another variable.
In addition, it also says that variable Y is Granger caused by variable X if variable X
assists in predicting the value of variable Y. If this is the case, it means that the




null hypothesis (Ho) that we test in this case is that the X variable does not Granger
cause variable Y and variable Y does not Granger cause variable X. In summary, one
variable (Xt) is said to Granger Cause another variable (Yt) if the lagged values of Xt
can predict Yt and vice-versa (Sarbapriya, 2013).
Impulse responses and variance decomposition
An examination of causality will suggest which of the variables in the model have
statistically significant impacts on the future values of each of the variables in the
system. But will not, by construction, be able to explain the sign of the relationship or
how long these effects require to take place. That is, the results will not reveal
whether changes in the value of a given variable have a positive or negative effect on
other variables in the system, or how long it would take for the effect of that variable
to work through the system. Such information will, however, be given by an
examination of the VAR' s impulse responses and variance decompositions (Brooks,
2008).
Impulse responses trace out the responsiveness of the dependent variables in the
VAR to shocks to each of the variables. So, for each variable from each equation
separately, a unit shock is applied to the error, and the effects upon the VAR system
over time are noted. Thus, if there are g variables in a system, a total of g2 impulse
responses could be generated (Brooks, 2008). The way that this is achieved in practice
is by expressing the VAR model as a vector autoregressive model is as a vector
moving average. Provided that the system is stable, the shock should gradually die
away (Brooks, 2008).
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41 Findings of the study
Introduction
The study converted the data for all three variables into logarithm form. The effect of
logarithms on the data analysis stage is to aid in reducing the fluctuations observed
in the data. In doing this, it enables the study to capture important patterns in the
data. The significance level chosen, at which the null hypothesis (Hs) is to be rejected,
is 5%. This section is divided into two: the first section contains the univariate
analysis, which examines the stationarity of the data. This is then succeeded by the
multivariate analysis, which tests for cointegration.
Univariate Characteristics
Unit Root Test
A unit root test assesses the stationarity in the time series data. Achieving
stationarity is vital for the purpose of forecasting. Furthermore, it rids the possibility
of a spurious regression. All three variables in this study were subjected to unit root
tests using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test supported by the Phillips-Perron test
which ensures robustness of the results. The null and altern ative hypotheses are as
follows:
Hs: 11 = 0
Ha : 11 <0
Civil Liberties
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Figure 1: Freedom House Civil Liberties Index
From the figure above it is evident that there is no trend in the data. The graph
meanders up and down in a manner that is unpredictable suggesting the existence of
non-stationarity. A stationarity test with intercept only was executed. The level




Null Hypothesis: CL has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.755386 0.3980
Test critical values: 1% level -3.565430
5% level -2.919952
10% level -2.597905
fkMacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 1: Augmented Dickef-Fuller Test on Civil Liberties
Interpretation of the results
The p-value, 39.8%, for the level stationarity test is greater than the 5% significance
level. Thus, we fail to reject the H, and run a Phillips-Perron test to ensure robustness
of the results.
Phillips-Perron Test
Null Hypothesis: CL has a unit root
IExogenous: Constant
Bandwidth: 2 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel
Adj. t-Stat Prob.*
Ph illips-Perron test statistic -1.714259 0.4182
Test critical values: 1% level -3.565430
5% level -2.919952
10% level -2.597905
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 2: Phillips-Perron Test on Civil Liberties
Interpretation of the results
The Phillips-Perron test confirms the non-stationarity in the data as the p-value of
41.82% is also greater than 5%. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. The
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implication is that the predictive power of fluctuations is undermined due to a
varying mean and variance.
From a sample of 141 countries, Gwartney, Hall, & Lawson (2010) analyze the nature
of institutional reform using data on different measures of each country's many
economic and political institutions. The trio finds that the results for Political Rights
(PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) are significant, which means these measures are
stationary or mean-reverting indicating that the changes to these two data series tend
to decay away and the series ultimately reverts to some prior mean level. Khan(2012)
empirically examined the Friedman hypothesis on political, civil and economic
freedom. After conducting unit root tests statistics, the scholar found that among a
number of unit root tests including Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron
tests, sufficient evidence was provided in favour of the presence of a unit root in civil
liberties.
First level integration of the data
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to assess the number of times the data needs to
be differenced in order to achieve stationarity. The outcome is shown below.
Null H ypothesis: D(CL) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
t-Statistic Prob.*
!Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.531751 0,0000
lTest critical values: 1% level -3.568308
5% level -2.921175
10% level -2.598551
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 3: ADF Integrated Order of Civil Liberties
Interpretation of the results
From table 3, we can reject the H e since the absolute ADF test statistic it is greater
than the absolute value for the 5% confidence level. The data attained stationarity
after being differenced
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once and is 1(1).
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Political Rights
















Figure 2 shows some volatility in the data thus it lacks a trend. A stationarity test
with intercept only was executed. The level results are illustrated below.
Interpretation of the results
The p-value, 33.74%, for the level stationarity test exceeds the 5% significance level.
Thus, we fail to reject the H, and run a Phillips-Perron test to ensure robustness of
the results.
Freedom House Political Rights Index
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Political Rights
Figure 2:
Null Hypothesis: PR has a unit root
IExogenous: Constant
lLagLength: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.883229 0.3374
Test critical values: 1% level -3.565430
5% level -2.919952
10% level -2.597905













Null Hypothesis: PR has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel
Adj. t-Stat Prob.*
Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.027323 0.2746
[Test critical values: 1% level -3.565430
5% level -2.919952
10% level -2.597905
ft"MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values,
Table 5: Phillips-Perrott Test for Political Rights
Interpretation of the results
The Phillips-Perron test confirms the non-stationarity in the data as the p-value of
27.46 % is greater than 5%. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. The data
has a varying mean and variance.
In his study, Khan(2012) also found sufficient evidence in favour of the presence of a
unit root in the political rights data.
First level integration of the data
Null Hypothesis: D(PR) has a unit root
IExogenous: Constant
ILagLength: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.065678 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.568308
5% level -2.921175
10% level -2.598551
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 6: Integrated Order of Political Rights
Interpretation of the results
From table 6, we can reject the H , since the absolute ADF test statistic it is greater
than the absolute value for the 5% confidence level. The data attained stationarity
after being differenced once and is 1(1) .
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GDP










Figure 3: World Bank GDP Index
From figure 3 above it is evident that GDP exhibits an upward trend . A stationarity
test with intercept and trend was executed. The level results are illustrated below.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
lNull Hypothesis: GDP has a unit root
IExogenous: Constant, Linear Trend
lLagLength: 3 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
t-Statistic Prob.*
lAugmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 2.536308 1.0000
lTestcritical values: 1% level -4.161144
5% level -3.506374
10% level -3.183002
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for GDP
Interpretation of the results
The p-value, 100%, for the level stationarity test exceeds the 5% significance level.
Thus, we fail to reject the H, and run a Phillips-Perron test to ensure robustness of
the results.
Phillips-Perron Test
Null Hypothesis: GDP has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend





Test critical values: 1% level
5% level
10% level
I*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.






Interpretation of the results
The Phillips-Perron test confirms the non-stationarity in the data as the p-value of
100% is also greater than 5 %. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. The
implication is that the data has a varying mean and variance.
Theory suggests that most economic variables exhibit long-run trend movement and
only become stationary after they are differenced . The empirical literature for unit
root shows that almost all macro-economic variables are non-stationary in level
while their difference is stationary. Therefore, it is not surprising that the GDP
variable shows non-stationarity in level.
First level integration of the data
Null Hypothesis: D(GDP) has a unit root
IExogenous: Constant, Linear Trend
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.852786 0.0217
Test critical values: 1% level -4.152511
5 % level -3.502373
10% level -3.180699
I*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 9: Integrated Order of GDP
Interpretation of the results
From table 9, we can reject the H , since the absolute ADF test statistic it is greater
than the absolute value for the 5 % confidence level. The data attained stationarity
after being differenced
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Once the relationship be tween the variables has been established, the study can then
move on to the next step which is examining the relationship between the 1(1) data.
The long run equilibrium relationship can only be tested for variables that are of a
higher integrated order than O. Since all three variables in the study are of 1(1), as
shown in tables 3, 6 and 9, the relationship between them can be tested for
cointegration. Proof of cointegration between the variables would imply that there is
a long run equilibrium relationship.
Engle-Granger Test for Cointegration
Engle and Granger (1987) tabulated a new set of critical values, hence, the test is
known as the Engle Granger (E.G.) test. Testing for cointegration between non-
stationary variables involves testing the time series characteristics of the residuals
from an OLS regression. This is because cointegration rests on the stationarity
properties of the residuals from a regression. In the regression below, the dependent




[Date: 11/18/15 Time: 06:13
~ample: 19632014
ncluded observations: 52
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CL 1.21E+09 3.31E+09 0.363902 0.7175
PR -8.30E+09 3.38E+09 -2.455329 0.0177
C 4.93E+10 9.68E+09 5.090890 0.0000
R-squared 0.234901 Mean dependent var 1.31E+10
iAdjusted R-squared 0.203673 S.D. dependent var 1.48E+10
S.E. of regression 1.32E+10 Akaike info criterion 49.50026
Sum squared resid 8.53E+21 Schwarz criterion 49.61283
lLog likelihood -1284.007 Hannan-Quirin criter. 49.54342












Below is the table showing the results obtained after subjecting the residuals of the
regression to a unit root test.
[Null Hypothesis: ECT has a unit root
IExogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
t-Statistic Prob.*
!Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.599486 0.8613
Test critical values: 1% level -3.568308
5% level -2.921175
10 % level -2.598551
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 11: Engle-Granger Test results
The null and alternative hypotheses are:
Ho: unit root in cointegrating regression's residuals
Hs: residuals from cointegrating regression are stationary
Interpretation of the results
The p-value of the residuals as shown from the table is 62.32%, therefore, we fail to
reject the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level. This means that the residuals are
not stationary and suggests that there is no cointegration between the variables. We
have therefore failed to isolate an equilibrium relationship. It is very important to
note that the Engle-Granger method suffers from a number of problems, namely:
unit root and co-integration tests have low power in finite samples thus we are
forced to treat the variables asymmetrically and to specify one as the dependent and
the other as independent variables. In addition, it prevents the study from
performing any hypothesis tests about the actual co-integrating relationship
estimated at the first stage (Brooks, 2008). The limitations of the Engle-Granger test
are addressed by the Johansen test of cointegration.
Johansen Test of Cointegration
The Johansen approach recognizes the importance of:
i. Relationships between the variables included in the system in levels, thereby
allowing us to obtain an intimation of the equilibrium relationship between
the variables.
ii. The evolution of the system of variables over subsequent time periods
thereby allowing us to capture the characteristics of the short run. dynamics of
the system at the same time as estimating a long run equilibrium relationship .
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[Date: 11/18/15 Time: 06:55
Sample (adjusted): 1965 2014
ncluded observations: 50 after adjustments
[I'rend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: CL CDP PR
Lags interval (in first differences) : 1 to 1
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
N Ol1tl \Ii 0.398791 42.72041 ~9.79707 0.0010
At most 1 " 0.2600:57 17.27981 15.49471 0.0267
At most 2 0.043443 2.220741 3.841466 O.1M:f
Trace tl:1i'!t indictlt~8 2. cointl:1grnting t1qn(t'!) tt l th~ 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.398791 25.44060 21.13162 0.0116
At most 1 * 0.260057 15.05907 14.26460 0.0374
At most 2 0.043443 2.220741 3.841466 0.1362
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05
level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Table 12: Johansen Test results
Interpretation of the results
Both the trace and max-eigenvalue tests indicate two cointegrating equations at the
5% significance level. Consequently, we reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
The Johansen test supports the existence of a long run equilibrium relationship
between civil liberties and CDP and also between political rights and CDP. This
implies that the both civil liberties and political rights will link with CDP in the long
run.
Benyishay & Betancourt (2010) report robust results with respect to the effect of huan
rights on long-term growth. Their results show that civil liberties outperform all
available indicators of proprty rights in explaining long-term economic growth.
Fedderke (2001), in his study on the relationship between economic activity and
political rights, found that there was absence of cointegration. However, he










association between rights and economic activity, since the association may be
subject to misspecification.
Hypothesis Testing
An important aspect in cointegration analysis is testing hypotheses about the
cointegration relations and the adjustment coefficients. Unlike the Engle-Granger
method, the Johansen setup allows the testing of hypotheses about the equilibrium
relationships between the variables. An important question is whether the
cointegrating vector is unique in the sense of all the variables spanning the
cointegration space. To answer this question we can test the importance of each
variable by dropping them one by one (imposing zero restrictions) from the reduced
form cointegration vectors and testing the validity of these restrictions.
In EViews, the hypotheses are specified by imposing restriction formulas between
the parameters. Matrix A refers to matrix ex and B to ~ .
Vector Error Correction Estimates
Date: 11/18/15 Time: 10:25
Sample (adjusted): 1966 2014
Included observations: 49 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
~ointegration Restrictions:
B(l,l)=O
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations.
Not all cointegrating vectors are identified
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):
Chi-square(l) 4.750430
Probability 0.029291
Table 13 Zero Restriction on Civil Liberties
Table 13 shows that the zero restriction on LCL is rejected implying that it is an
important variable spanning the cointegration space. This means that in the long run
it is a significant variable in explaining Kenya's GDP.
Vector Error Correction Estimates
Date: 11/18/15 Time: 10:31
Sample (adjusted): 1966 2014
Included observations: 49 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
Cointegration Restrictions:
B(1,3)=0
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations.
Not all cointegrating vectors are identified
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):
Chi-square(l) 10.98493
Probability 0.000919
Table 14: Zero Restriction on Political Rights
Table 14 shows that the zero restriction on LPR is not rejected implying that it is not
an important variable spanning the cointegration space. Therefore, it does not playa
significant role in the long run in explaining Kenya's GDP. In terms of the structural

















Granger causality is a statistical concept of causality that is based on prediction.
According to Granger causality, if a signal Xl "Granger-causes" (or "G-causes") a
signal X2, then past values of Xi should contain information that helps predict
X2 above and beyond the information contained in past values of X2 alone. Granger
causality tests in this study are used to examine the dynamic relation between GDP,
civil liberties and political rights.
lPairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 11/18/15 Time: 06:21
Isample: 19632014
lLags: 2
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
GDP does not Granger Cause CL 50 0.09929 0.9057
CL does not Granger Cause GDP 2.57690 0.0872
PR does not Granger Cause CL 50 0.60912 0.5483
CL does not Granger Cause PR 2.69646 0.0783
PR does not Granger Cause GDP 50 5.62880 0.0066
GDP does not Granger Cause PR 0.94878 0.3948
Table 15 Granger Causalitsj results
Apart from political rights that Granger Cause GDP, none of the other results shows
any causality that is significant at 5% level. However, there is some causality that is




Response to Cholesky One S.D . Innovations
Impulse Responses
An impulse response refers to the reaction of an y dynamic system in response to
some external change. Specifically, impulse response analysis enables us to answer
the question: what is the likely response of variable y1l at time i, t+l , to a shock
in Y 2/ at time t?
1
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1 Response of GCP to GCP Res pon s e of GOP to 0-
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They give the proportion of the movements in the dependent variables that are due
to their "own" shocks, versus shocks to the other variables. The variance
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decomposition gives information about the relative importance of each shock to the
variables in the VAR.
l 10 0
Variance Decomposition
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5/ Conclusions and Recommendations
The main objective of the paper was to examine the relationship between institutions
and economic growth in Kenya for the period 1963 to 2014. The main variables that
were used to measure political institutions are civil liberties and political rights. The
Freedom House Index was used to obtain the data pertaining to political rights and
civil liberties.
The first chapter of the paper introduces the issues to be addressed in the
paper with the objectives and the significance of the research at the heart of the
section. Chapter two presents the literature review of the conceptual framework that
underpins the variables as well as the empirical work that has been conducted
globally to establish the relationship between the variables. In the third chapter, the
methodology for the evaluation of the hypothesis is presented, and finally the fourth
chapter presents the results for the implementation of the methodology.
All three variables exhibited non-stationarity after performing unit root tests
and were consequently differenced. They were all 1(1). Cointegration tests were run
on the variables to determine the long run relationships that existed. The Engle-
Granger test showed no cointegration between the variables. After subjecting the
variables to a Johansen test, cointegration was found to exist indicating two
cointegrating equations. This proves that indeed a long run relationship exists
among the variables.
The VAR models of Granger Causality arid impulse Responses were used to
evaluate the short run relationship between the variables. Granger Causality tests
reveal that political rights Granger Cause GDP at the 5% significance level. However,
at the 10% level there was some significant causality from civil liberties to GDP and
civil liberties to political rights.
Policy Recommendations
In terms of policy, this study implies that political institutions and GDP in Kenya are
non-stationary, thus have long run consequences. For this reason, policy makers
should be aware that changes to political institutions affect long run economic
growth although the effects are lagged and felt at a later stage. Caution should be
taken when making reforms or amending the rule of law or documents that have a
direct impact on political institutions. In order for Kenya's institutions to be highly
efficient, policymakers must create a balance through formal laws and regulations so
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